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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Malcolm Cornelius Mack appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to
suppress evidence discovered during a traffic stop. Mr. Mack claims the officer violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully prolonging the stop, first by making inquiries about
drug trafficking activity, and then later, by conducting a dog sniff. The evidence should have
been suppressed and the district court's order should be reversed.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the initial State's claims regarding Mr. Mack's
argument that the stop was unlawfully prolonged while the officer was questioning the driver
about transporting drugs, and to demonstrate that Mr. Mack's argument is properly before this
Court for review, and that the officer's conduct violated Mr. Mack's Fourth Amendment rights.
Because the State's remaining claims are unremarkable, Mr. Mack respectfully refers this Court
to his Appellant's Brief as his response.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Mack's Appellant's Brief, and will not be repeated here.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mack's motion to suppress?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mack's Motion To Suppress

A.

Mr. Mack's Argument That The Officer's Unrelated Questioning Unlawfully Prolonged
The Traffic Stop Is Properly Before This Court On Appeal
In this appeal, Mr. Mack asserts, as he did in the district court, that Officer Cottrell

violated his Fourth Amendment rights by prolonging the traffic stop to conduct inquiries
unrelated to the mission of the traffic stop; specifically, (a) by questioning the driver about
possible drug trafficking activities, and (b) by conducting a dog sniff (Appellant's Brief, pp.825.)
With regard to his argument (a), Mr. Mack claims that the district court erred in failing to
find that the officer prolonged the traffic stop by asking questions about the transportation
contraband, instead of pursuing the traffic tasks related to the investigation of the traffic stop, in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, under the controlling precedent of Rodriguez v.

United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), and State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605 (2016), (See Appellant's
Brief, pp.12-14.) Specifically, he argues that the State's uncontested evidence shows that the
officer had detoured from his traffic mission when, after obtaining the driver's license, insurance
document, and the vehicle's current registration, the officer began an additional line of
questioning, wholly unrelated to the traffic infractions for which the vehicle had been stopped.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-14.)
The State has argues that Mr. Mack's argument is not preserved.

(Respondent's

Br., p.10.) The State claims Mr. Mack never asserted, in the district court, that the traffic stop
was extended by the officer's unrelated questioning, only that the dog sniff extended the stop.
(Respondent's Br., p.10.) The State's preservation argument fails for several reasons. First, as a
threshold matter, the State's argument misapprehends the parties' respective burdens on this
3

suppression motion where a defendant challenges the legality of his warrantless seizure by the
police. As the State properly conceded below, Mr. Mack was "seized," and that the burden
therefore shifted to the State to justify the seizure under an exception to warrant requirement.
(R., p.97.)

As noted in the Appellant's Brief, at page 11: "Importantly, in addressing a

defendant's claim that his detention was unlawfully prolonged, "[t]he burden is on the State to
demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify was sufficiently limited both in scope, and
duration."

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (emphasis added); accord State v.

Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 423 (1995).

That burden never shifted to Mr. Mack, and thus,

Mr. Mack did not have a burden in the district court to argue or demonstrate how or why his
seizure was unlawfully prolonged. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; Pannell, 127 Idaho at 423. The
opposite was true: the burden was on the State to argue and prove that the officer did not
unlawfully extend traffic stop. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 353 (2015).
Second, the State wrongly asserts that Mr. Mack's motion to suppress was "framed,
argued, and analyzed" as being about the constitutionality of the dog sniff, only. (Respondent's
Br., p.10.) Certainly, that was one of the ways in which this stop was extended, and one of the
arguments Mr. Mack had made below. (See R., pp.75-77.) However, Mr. Mack's position on
the ''unlawful extension" issue was in no way limited to the time added by the dog sniff On the
contrary, his Affidavit, his Brief in Support of Motion, and his cross-examination of Officer
Cottrell at the hearing, encompass the position that Officer Cottrell had extended the traffic stop
by asking questions that were not related to the pursuit of the traffic stop; his position was never
limited to an extension only by virtue of the dog sniff. (See R., pp.61-87; Tr., p.38, L.16 - p.39,
L.39, L.19.) For example, in his Affidavit, Mr. Mack alleges Officer Cottrell abandoned his
traffic mission by asking questions, e.g., "Instead of checking to see if [the driver] had
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outstanding warrants, Officer Cottrell continued to make small talk with me," and "Officer
Cottrell abandoned the reasons for the stop" and "extended the stop unnecessarily," rather than
pursuing the traffic stop's purposes of issuing the traffic citation or verifying identities."
(R., pp.61-64.) Additionally, in his Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, Mr. Mack sets forth
the salient facts, including the fact that after the driver had produced the requested information,
Officer Cottrell continued to question him, asking "whether anyone had asked them to transport
anything across state lines," and "ifthere was anything in the trunk which [the officer] needed to
be concerned about," and then told the driver he had "a drug detection dog in the patrol car."
(R., pp.66, 69.) The Brief in Support also set forth argument and authority detailing how and
why unrelated questioning, including questions about drugs, "cannot be justified as part of the

traffic stop," and quoted extensively from State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647 (Ct. App. 2002).
(R., pp.72-75.) Notably, the traffic stop in Guitierrez was unlawfully extended as the result of
officer questioning; Guitierrez did not involve a dog sniff. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 647-53.
Mr. Mack's position further evolved at the evidentiary hearing, as his counsel crossexamined Officer Cottrell, making it clear that Mr. Mack was pursuing the fact that the officer
had begun questioning the driver about criminal activities during the traffic stop. (Tr., p.38,
Ls.17-23.) Specifically, counsel examined Officer Cottrell about asking the driver whether there
was "anything in the car that's illegal or anything that you should be worried about - those types
of questions ... that was the point where you began your drug investigation," and counsel
elicited the following testimony from the officer:
At that point, I'm addressing the original reasons for the stop and then I'm asking
questions pertinent to the multiple vent clip air fresheners, yeah. So yep, I'm
starting to ask him questions relative to anything criminal . ... "
(Tr., p.39, Ls.2-6 (emphasis added).)
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Finally, given the above, it is clear that Mr. Mack's appellate argument fits squarely
within the recent holdings of the Idaho Supreme Court regarding issue preservation: "so long as
a substantive issue is properly preserved, a party's appellate argument may evolve on appeal,"
State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 223 (2019) (citing Ada County Hwy. Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc.,
162 Idaho 13 8, 142 n.2 (2017) ); and "both the issue and the party's position on the issue must be
raised before the trial court," State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99 (2019) (citing Brooke View,
162 Idaho at 142 n.2). The Supreme Court distilled the salient points of Brooke View as follows:
The case involved a takings claim after the Highway District used eminent
domain to install a drainage ditch and walkway on Brook View's 1 property.
Brook View first contested the amount paid in just compensation, but the
litigation shifted its focus to separate damages when the Highway District's
construction destroyed portions of a decorative dividing wall. After repeatedly
rejecting the Highway District's argument that the damage should not be
considered as part of the just-compensation calculus, the district court held that
the damage was part of the takings claim. On appeal, the Highway District
maintained its position, but supplemented its argument with citation to two
relevant Idaho statutes dealing with the interpretation of the just-compensation
statute. This Court rejected Brook View's argument that this additional authority
represented an unpreserved issue on appeal. We held that the Highway District
could fine-tune its argument because the issue was properly raised below and its
position on that issue had not changed.
Hoskins, 165 Idaho at 224 (emphasis added).
Like in Booke View, the substantive issue raised on appeal in Mr. Mack's case is the same
as the substantive issue he raised in the district court: Did Officer Cottrell's "seizure" violate
Mr. Mack's Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully exceeding the limited scope and duration
justified by the traffic stop's original purpose, without independent reasonable suspicion?
(R., pp.59-67; Appellant's Brief, pp.9-14.) Likewise, Mr. Mack's position on that issue below,
was the same as his position on appeal: that Officer Cottrell unlawfully extended the duration of

1

The Respondent, "Brooke View, Inc.," is referenced as "Brook View" throughout the Court's
op1mon.
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the traffic stop by deviating from his traffic mission to question the driver about carrying
contraband, specifically about drugs, without having reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
(R., pp.59-67; Tr., p.39, Ls.2-19; Appellant's Brief, pp.9-14.)
Thus, just as in Brooke View, Mr. Mack's unlawful extension argument had permissibly
"evolved" during the litigation and on appeal, but the substantive issue, and Mr. Mack's position
on it, remain unchanged. Regardless of how the State chose to brief the issue below, or how the
district court chose to frame the question in its written decision, the issue and Mr. Mack's
position on it were presented in the district court, and his argument is properly before this Court
for review, in accordance with the controlling precedent. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at 99. The State's
preservation argument fails and should be rejected.
B.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Find That The Officer Prolonged The Traffic Stop
By Questioning The Driver About Transporting Contraband
The State goes on to argue that the officer's questioning about possible drugs or

contraband was nonetheless permissible as part of the traffic stop; the original purpose of the
traffic stop was for following too closely and a possible window-tint infraction.

(Respondent's

Br., pp.11-14.) The State bases its argument, in part, on the Court of Appeals' statement in
State v. Still, 166 Idaho 351, _, 458 P.3d 220, 225 (2019), that Rodriquez "does not prohibit all

conduct that in any way slows the officer from completing the stop as fast as humanly possible."
(Respondent's Br., p.14.) The State's reliance on Still is woefully misplaced. First, the quoted
sentence from Still is taken directly from the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v.
Campbell, 912 F.3d 1340, 1353 (11th Cir. 2019). See Still, 458 P.3d at 225 n.2. However, as

made clear by the next sentence in Campbell, Rodriguez does prohibit an officer from slowing
the stop's completion in order "to investigate other crimes." 912 F.3d at 1353. In context, the
Campbell statement reads:
7

[Campbell] suggests, for example, that the officer unlawfully prolonged the stop
by taking a few seconds to retrieve his coat or by looking Campbell in the eye
while they conversed rather than exclusively focusing on writing the ticket. But
Rodriguez does not prohibit all conduct that in anyway slow the officer from
completing the stop as fast as humanly possible. It prohibits prolonging a stop to
investigate other crimes.

Id. at 1353 (emphasis original to the Campbell).)
The Campbell Court also made the point that even where an officer is generally diligent,
"diligence does not provide an officer with cover to slip in a few unrelated questions." 912 F.3d
at 1352-53. The Court went on to conclude that the officer had asked unrelated questions about
contraband and drugs, and that this questioning violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights. Campbell, at 1353.
Even in Still, the Idaho Court of Appeals appears recognize that, absent an independent
justification, investigations into other crimes are expressly prohibited under Rodriguez. 458 P.3d
at 225. As set forth in the Appellant's Brief, the officer in Mr. Mack's case had plainly detoured
from his traffic mission when he took about twenty-seven seconds to question the driver about
the contents of the Lexus, specifically asking whether there was "anything in the vehicle I should
be concerned about?" and, aside from the vehicle itself, whether "anyone has asked you to drive
anything across state lines?" whether there was "anything in the trunk that I should be concerned
about?" and "any reason that you can think of that the dog would alert - any drugs in the
vehicle?" (Ex., at 8:25-9:07.) (Appellant's Brief, pp.2-3, 12-13.) Thus, under the controlling
precedent of Rodriguez, and even under Still, the officer's questioning about other crimes cannot
be justified as part of an investigation of the traffic violations for which the car was originally
stopped (following too closely and a possible window-tint violation), and, in the absence of other
independent reasonable suspicion, violated Mr. Mack's Fourth Amendment rights.

8

As to the State's argument that the officer must completely "abandon" 2 his traffic mission
before an unlawful prolonging may be found, and that "brief questions" about other crimes are
permissible and do not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation (Respondent's
Br., p.14), such argument is manifestly wrong and contradicts Rodriguez, and finds no support in
Linze. 3 In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court rejected the "overall reasonableness"

standard that the State seems to promote.

In Rodriguez, the government had argued,

unsuccessfully, that it was acceptable under the Fourth Amendment for an officer to
"incrementally prolong the stop" for unrelated inquiries, "so long as the officer is reasonably
diligent and the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable" and the officer "completes all
traffic-related tasks expeditiously."

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added).

The

Rodriguez Court explicitly rejected this argument, noting that the government's position would

effectively allow "bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation." Id. The Court held
that if an officer makes unrelated inquiries in a way that "measurably extend" or "'prolongs' -

2

As set forth in his Appellant's Brief, page 12, note 5, Rodriguez does not require an
"abandonment" of the traffic stop in order to find a Fourth Amendment violation. Rather,
Rodriguez recognizes that an officer may conduct inquiries during an otherwise lawful traffic
stop, but a Fourth Amendment violation occurs if, in doing so, the officer '"prolongs' - i.e., adds
time to-'the stop."' 575 U.S. at 349.
3
To the extent that the Court of Appeals decisions in State v. Still, 166 Idaho 351, _, 458 P.3d
220, 225 (2019), and State v. McGraw, 163 Idaho 736, 741 (Ct. App. 2018), purport to stand for
the proposition now argued by the State (see Respondent's Br., p.9), Still and McGraw are
manifestly wrong and should be rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. It has long been held that
an individual "may not be detained even momentary without reasonable objective grounds,"
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983), and in Rodriguez, the Court held that even de
minimis extensions of a traffic stop, which some courts had previously found acceptable under
the Fourth Amendment's "general reasonableness" standard, violate the Fourth Amendment.
575 U.S. at 349. The Court of Appeals' insistence in Still and McGraw that counting "pauses"
during the traffic stop is "inimical to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement" is
contrary to the clear, controlling precedent, and should be rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court.
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i.e., adds time to - 'the stop,"' the officer violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. 575 U.S. at 355,

356.
Likewise, the Rodriguez Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's de minim is standard, under
which minor extensions of seizures had been tolerated by some courts as "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment. Id.

The Supreme Court made clear that the length of the extension is

immaterial, and that unless the unrelated inquiries do not measurably prolong, i.e., add time to,
the stop, the inquiries violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. 575 U.S. at 357,
359.
As argued in the Appellant's Brief, the information available to Officer Cottrell when he
extended the stop to question the driver about the transportation of drugs or other contraband,
was insufficient as a matter of law to provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify
the prolonging. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-24.)
C.

The State's Remaining Arguments Are Unremarkable And Mr. Mack Refers This Court
To His Appellant's Brief As His Arguments In Reply
The State's remaining arguments are unremarkable and Mr. Mack respectfully refers this

court to his Appellant's Brief as his arguments in reply.

CONCLUSION
The district court erred in failing to conclude the officer unlawfully prolonged the stop in
violation of Mr. Mack's Fourth Amendment rights. For the reasons set forth in his Appellant's
Brief, and those herein, this Court should reverse the district court's order denying Mr. Mack's
motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction for marijuana trafficking, and remand his
case to the district court for further proceedings to allow Mr. Mack to withdraw his guilty plea.
DATED this 27 th day of July, 2020.

I sf Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
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Administrative Assistant
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